On April 1 when the Islamic Republic of Iran's consulate in Damascus was attacked by Israeli warplanes, the news could have been treated as a prank on All Fools' Day. Even though seven Iranian military personnel, including two senior commanders, were killed, there was no reason to treat the incident as different from similar operations over the past decades of hostility between the mullahs and the "Zionist entity".
Since 1990, when the two protagonists intensified their enmity, a dozen Iranian generals have been assassinated by Israeli agents inside Iran or in Iranian bases in Syria or Lebanon. Israel also succeeded in "taking out" a number of prominent non-Iranian agents, including Lebanese Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyeh, a man far more important to Tehran than the "commanders" killed in Damascus.
Israel was also responsible for the "elimination" of at least eight Iranian nuclear scientists and suspicious explosions in several military sites across the Islamic Republic.
Over the decades, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic's ultimate decision-maker, observed what he calls "strategic patience", limiting his response to the burning of Israeli flags and the murder of Jews in Argentina and Bulgaria, among other places, while using Lebanese hirelings for occasional attacks on the fringes of the "Zionist entity".
Both Iran and Israel were anxious not to push things beyond a point after which direct war could become inevitable. The "keeping limits" accord the two sides had reached through French mediation in 2006 worked to their advantage, as they found each other's threshold of pain.
On April 1, however, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broke the rules of the game by trying to retest Tehran's threshold of pain.
This time he attacked a building flying the Islamic Republic's official flag and sheltering its command-and-control headquarters in parts of Syria under its occupation. Worse still, for the first time, he decided to publicly admit Israeli responsibility. The message was "I hit you hard and brag about it. What are you going to do?"
I am almost certain Khamenei initially wanted to, once again, grin and bear it.
He repeated his usual mutterings about "strategic patience" and "crushing revenge when the time comes", and signaled that his threshold of pain hadn't been crossed.
He may have realized that Netanyahu was setting a trap for him by forcing him to actively side with Hamas "terrorists", thus reminding the Western bleeding-hearts marching for Palestine in London, Paris and Washington that Israel has another deadly enemy.
Then, with his "strategic patience" slogan becoming a stand-up comedy theme, Khamenei ran into the minefield that slogan-mongers often end up reaching.
In a public show meeting with handpicked "students", the "Supreme Guide" was almost mocked for his meekness.
He was asked why he wouldn't let "martyrdom-seeking youths" to go fight in Gaza. A student wondered aloud whether the "Zionist enemy" wouldn't be encouraged to "murder senior figures in Tehran."
Caricatures appearing in Arab and Turkish press made fun of the Iranian cat seeking a hole in which to hide.
Khamenei reached the "something-must-be-done" point that all leaders who need to appear to be doing something but lack the courage to do anything reach. The standard answer in such cases is to do something that appears to be what needs to be done but, in fact, is only a shadow.
This is how he did it:
First he ordered the High Council of National Security to hold a plenary session and "recommend" what to do. Thus, the decision to do something, in case that something had unintended consequences, wouldn't be his alone. Next, he ordered preparation of big fireworks that would look impressive on TV.
His missile-man 1-star Gen. Hajizadeh, dreaming of a second star, hurried to assemble as many projectiles as he could: drones, rockets, medium-range missiles, hypersonic missiles and sundry other devices, and reported: Ready to go!
Khamenei then sent his Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to travel to Muscat, Oman, the usual point of contact with the American "Great Satan", to inform Washington of Tehran's intention to attack Israel. The message was relayed and attracted a nod from Washington provided it gets full details in advance of the operation.
Tehran agreed.
As a result, the US had all the information needed five days before the attack.
That was quickly shared with Israel, other regional allies and NATO members, including Britain and France as well as Turkey, that was to play a vital role in providing flight coordinates and tracking reports on the day.
Thus, when Khamenei's attack started, the US and Israel were fully prepared. Because of the distance between Israel and the four launching sites in Iran, the US, Israeli and allied forces had between 8 and 10 hours in which to puncture Hajizadeh's flying balloons.
Khamenei could declare a "victory," which Ayatollah Dejkam, a notorious sycophant, labeled "Iran's greatest triumph since Nader Shah conquered India" in the 18th century.
By pushing his threshold of pain further, Khamenei has managed not to fall into the trap laid for him by Netanyahu.
Most commentators have seen the episode as a victory for Netanyahu.
But is it?
Tehran's firework show pushed the Gaza war into oblivion for a few days. Several anti-Israeli demos in Europe were canceled and, instead, Paris hosted a demo "in solidarity with Israel" against the Islamic Republic. The anti-Netanyahu fever subsided for a few days. The US Congress approved a big new handout for Israel.
But Bibi would be wrong to beat his chest in triumph.
Things ended up well for Israel for a number of reasons not related to his leadership. Forswearing a surprise attack, Khamenei played the script written by Washington, providing ample time to destroy 99 per cent of Hajizadeh's projectiles. Israel's anti-missile defense mechanisms worked to a T, and 10 nations, all arrayed by Washington, provided bases and intelligence material or directly took part in destroying Haijzadeh's flying objects.
Next time, however, those favorable conditions may not be available. Everyone now knows that Tehran is capable of launching a tsunami of death by air against Israel and that there is no guarantee that Washington would be informed of all details in advance.
The real winner in this dangerous game was the US, which re-establishes itself as the un-expendable power in the Middle East. Both Khamenei, who now depends on US to prevent an Israeli "revenge" attack, and Netanyahu, who dodged a deadly bullet, are now forced to listen to a third player that alone has the ability to make a difference.
Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable publications, published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since 1987. He is the Chairman of Gatestone Europe.
This article originally appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat and is reprinted with some changes by kind permission of the author.
